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Nomenclature and Abbreviations 
 
Aft—toward the stern or the ship.  Also known as abaft. 
Amidship—the center portion of the ship between the bow and the stern 
Bow—the forward most part of a ship 
BuC&R—Bureau of Construction and Repair oversaw ship construction for the Navy 
Bulkhead—a wall in a ship 
BuShips—merged BuC&R and Bureau of Engineering to oversee USN design and construction 
Butt weld—two flat plates that are joined with a full penetration weld resulting in the best bond 
Centerline bulkhead—a bulkhead on the center of a ship which isolates port and starboard sides 
CINCPAC—Commander in Chief of US Navy Pacific Fleet, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz 
CO—the Commanding Officer of a ship is responsible for all aspect of ship management. 
Condition Affirm (or Afirm)—prepare the ship for action by making closures watertight 
Damage Control or DC Central—the hub of communication for the ship’s first responders 
DC Repair Teams—first response teams of firemen, carpenters, electricians to save the ship 
Deck—a floor in a ship 
Emergency Breathing Device (EBD)—used during firefighting to prevent suffocation by CO₂ 
Forward—toward the bow of the ship 
Fillet weld—a weld joining two metal surfaces that are not flat but are at an angle to one another 
Fire/Boiler Rooms— the ship propulsion and power steam generation rooms  
Flash gear—non-combustible apparel used by firefighters in combating flames 
Flight Deck—topside deck of the ship used for aircraft launch and return 
Frame—a frame is a rib of the ship.  They are usually equal spaced in various locations. 
Full penetration weld—the welding of two independent surfaces such that they are fully bonded 
Hanger Deck—internal deck under the flight deck used for aircraft maintenance and repair 
Knot—a nautical measure of speed equal to 1.15 statute miles per hour 
Lap weld—a low strength weld at the intersection of two plates that overlap over each other 
Navy Cross—second only to the Medal of Honor in military decorations  
Navy Distinguished Service Medal—for exceptional duty in a position of high responsibility  
Plug weld—a low strength weld that fills an opening such as a rivet opening in shell plate 
Port—to the left of the ship while facing forward 
Rivet—a metal fastener used on ships to join lapped plates with a mechanical bond 
Ring weld—a weld that runs the circumference of a rivet.  It is subject to cracking (failure). 
Scuttle—a fast means of gaining access to a watertight area using a quick opening manway 
Shell plating—the exterior skin of a ship that forms a watertight boundary for internal structure 
Silver Star—third highest decoration awarded by the United States military 
Sprinkling system—firefighting system using overhead fixtures to dispense water in a space  
Starboard—to the right of the ship while facing forward 
Stern—the after part of the ship that is opposite the bow  
Task Force—an organization of naval ships usually revolving around one or more carriers 
Turn of the bilge—portion of the ship that is the intersection of the ship’s side and bottom 
Water curtain fire protection—a firefighting wall of water that segregates zones of the hanger 
XO—EXecutive Officer is the second in command of the ship who supervises department heads 
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Abstract 
This study reveals how the Pacific war changed at Coral Sea and Midway due to a little 
known but important cadre of sailors on USS Yorktown (CV5).  Those US victories resulted from 
not only clever code breakers and courageous airmen but equally from the determined Damage 
Control (DC) crews aboard Yorktown.  DC crews were the ship’s first responders.   They fought 
fires, kept power and propulsion operable, controlled the ship’s stability, and patched her flight 
deck to keep aircraft flying.  DC teams saved Yorktown multiple times, and their story is 
memorable for their contributions at Coral Sea and Midway.  Without DC efforts, CV5 would 
not have participated in the battle of Midway.  Without Yorktown, the commitment of only two 
American carriers (with one being virtually inexperienced) against four Japanese carriers with 
their skilled airmen would have yielded disaster for the United States at Midway instead of 
victory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: USS Yorktown CV5; Damage Control; Coral Sea; Midway; Buckmaster; Aldrich
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Introduction 
 
A city cannot survive without a determined force of “first responders.”  These vigilant 
individuals are trained to meet emerging catastrophic situations.  A ship at sea is like a city.  It is 
a self-sustaining entity for much of its life.  A ship also requires a skilled set of technicians and 
craftsmen to contain or repair damages that may befall the vessel.  A warship is particularly 
vulnerable to attack and thus the first responders or Damage Control (DC) crewmen are 
especially vital to survival.   
From December 1941 to June 1942, the United States (US) experienced severe defeats.  
Japan overran Allied bastions, seizing Asian territory and resources.  American battleships losses 
at Pearl Harbor necessitated reliance upon a small fleet of aircraft carriers— “a fleet in being”1 
which kept the Japanese from overwhelming the Pacific.  One carrier, USS Yorktown (CV5), 
played a pivotal role in reversing American fortunes by mid-1942.   
Among the critical engagements of World War II, the battles of the Coral Sea and 
Midway in the Pacific in May and June 1942, respectively, were decisive.   They represent the 
climax of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) offensive in the Pacific Ocean. Coral Sea and 
Midway were two naval battles in which surface ships fought but never saw each other.  The 
naval offensive weapons were aircraft, not ships.  At Midway, four Japanese carriers would be 
pitted against three American carriers with one, the USS Hornet, being inexperienced.  Had CV5 
not been in the fight, the odds at Midway would have been two to one against the United States.  
The outcome would have been cataclysmic for the Americans.   
                                                 
1 Defined by Julian S. Corbett in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Naval and Military Press, 
1911), on pages167 and 211-228 as a fleet not strong enough to engage in a major encounter with the enemy.  
Rather, the fleet, in its weakness, can only harass the enemy in order to assert itself while not risking extermination.  
Refer also to Clark G. Reynolds, "The U.S. Fleet-in-Being Strategy of 1942," The Journal of Military History, Vol. 
58, No. 1, January 1994,  103-118. 
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In studying this period, the researcher will discover the importance of the United States 
aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV5) and the story of the ship’s recurring survival and 
contribution to the American victories at Coral Sea and Midway.  The contribution of the DC 
crewmen aboard Yorktown to the American victory is noteworthy.  Those crewmen assigned to 
Damage Control were the first responders on the ship.  They fought fires, flooding, and structural 
damage that might make the ship inoperable.  The DC crews quickly repaired damage to the 
flight deck where defensive air operations were essential for protection.  The carrier’s air group 
offensive strikes would be the key to victory.  Those DC crewmen saved their ship not just once 
but several times after Japanese attacks during the battles of Coral Sea and Midway.  The DC 
teams on Yorktown helped to change the tide of war in the Pacific.  Their contribution in saving 
Yorktown’s lives, as well as lessons learned from their struggles, are worthy of explanation.  
The primary source materials on the Damage Control crews on USS Yorktown (CV5) 
have all but been overlooked by historians.  The DC crews were highly capable and up to the 
challenges of both Coral Sea and Midway. Though seldom told in detail, the story is revealed 
through the use of archival Bureau of Construction and Repair (later the Bureau of Ships) 
reports, specifications and documents available in the National Archives and Records 
Administration at College Park, Maryland and in Washington, D.C.  U.S. Navy after action 
reports from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), Task Force Commander, 
Commanding Officer (CO) and the Executive Officer (XO) for CV5 and other ship commanders 
during the battles are also available in College Park.  Related Washington Post articles can also 
be found at College Park.  A DC crewman’s memoir and the ship photographer’s oral history 
provide first hand accounts of the battles of Coral Sea and Midway.  Archival photographs of 
Yorktown’s damages are at College Park, as well as The National World War II Museum in New 
3 
 
Orleans, Louisiana.  The Yorktown’s general ship drawings are available on the website for 
Historical Naval Ships Association and combat narratives written at the time are found on The 
Naval History and Heritage Command website.   Figures on damages to CV5 based on after 
action reports are available on-line via the Battle of Midway Roundtable website.  World War II 
DC Manual details are available on-line.   
Secondary sources were examined to provide an understanding of the details of the 
battles.  In so doing, Samuel Eliot Morison’s multivolume history of the US Navy (USN) in 
World War II2 in conjunction with works by authors John Toland,3 Walter Lord,4 Gordon 
Prague,5 John Lundstrom,6 Jonathan Parshall coauthoring with Anthony Tully,7 Craig Symonds,8 
and Ian Toll9 provide some insight into DC efforts on Yorktown.  Aircraft carrier technological 
advances leading to Yorktown DC can be found in several books that offer an appreciation of 
CV5 design development in support of DC. 10 
  
                                                 
2 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Vol. IV Coral Sea, 
Midway and Submarine Actions (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949), and S.E. Morison, History of United 
States Naval Operations in World War II: Vol XIV Victory in the Pacific 1945 (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1960). 
3 John Toland, But Not in Shame: The Six Months After Pearl Harbor (New York: Random House, 1961). 
4 Walter Lord, Incredible Victory: The Battle of Midway. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1967). 
5 Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway. Edited by Donald M. and Katherine V. Dillon Goldstein (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1982). 
6 John B. Lundstrom, The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway (Annapolis, 
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984). 
7 Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. 
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005). 
8 Craig L. Symonds, The Battle of Midway (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
9 Ian W. Toll, Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942 (New York London: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2012). 
10 Norman Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History with Ship Plans by A.D.Baker III 
(Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1983), and William M. McBride, Technological Change and 
the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
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Chapter 1—Evolution of Damage Control on USS Yorktown (CV5) 
The evolution of aircraft carrier damage control techniques that saved USS Yorktown 
twice in 1942 must be considered within the framework of geopolitical events of the period.  The 
years between the First and Second World Wars saw changes in alliances, military strategy and 
naval arms races as well as technological advances in shipbuilding.    The Five-Power Naval 
Limitation Treaty signed in Washington, D.C. in 1922 restricted US naval strength.  Therein, the 
US, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy agreed to limit displacement of warships with 
emphasis on aircraft carriers not exceeding 27,000 tons.  This restricted armor protection.   Other 
treaties and agreements set the ratio of ships between the US, Great Britain, and Japan to 5:5:3, 
respectively.  As Clark G. Reynolds says, “The weight restrictions imposed by the treaties 
demanded economy through qualitative improvements to warship hull design: better steel and 
lighter alloys, arc welding instead of rivets, and fewer but larger boilers.”11  Aircraft carriers 
became a focus in the arms race due to their mobility and power projection capability. 
As William McBride states in his work on technology changes in the U.S. Navy: “During 
the late 1930s, independent carrier operations came to dominate U.S. naval thinking since 
carriers, tied to the battle line, were believed to be easy victims of enemy air attack.”12  Although 
the small carrier Ranger, commissioned in 1934, was the first ship designed as an aircraft carrier, 
it would prove to be ineffective in combat because of its small size.  The Yorktown and sister 
ship Enterprise became the first large US carriers to be designed from the keel up with a full set 
of carrier specifications and drawings.  “Pairs of similar carriers were considered tactically 
superior and, in September 1931, the General Board [of the Navy] recommended construction of 
                                                 
11 Clark G Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: William 
Morrow & Company, Inc., 1974), 484. 
12 William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 193. 
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two 20,000-ton carriers (Yorktown and Enterprise) in fiscal year 1933 [...] The Yorktown design 
was a compromise and outdated [due to limited displacement] by 1938.”13  In fact, Reynolds 
points out that by “the last week of 1936, Japanese obedience to the limitations [...] ended.”14  
Nevertheless, the focus on damage control and related protective elements within the design of 
the carriers can be seen in the design specifications issued by the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair (BuC&R) within the US Navy.  Examining the definition and detail in the specifications 
for CV5, the attention given to armor and firefighting are notable.  There are extensive sections 
on the latter topic.  Under the specification titles of “Damage Control—Flooding and Sprinkling 
Systems” and “Fire Systems” the 1934 specifications on Yorktown indicates attention to the 
details of damage control for magazine flooding, hanger sprinkling, and water curtain deluge 
systems, as well as firefighting on the ship.15 
Emphasis on survival of the ship after enemy attack came to be known as “damage 
control.”  Naval Academy textbooks in the 1920s and 1930s taught midshipmen the importance 
of keeping their warship in the fight despite injury.  One such book used during the construction 
of CV5 was Principles of Warship Construction and Damage Control:  
In the ten years since the first edition of this book was published, the question of 
damage control, that is, the operation of a warship so as to preserve the fighting 
efficiency when the hull has been damaged by enemy attack, has slowly but 
certainly assumed a dominant position in the minds of naval personnel commen-
surate with its importance as a decisive factor in modern naval warfare.  The 
development of this phase of naval operations has now reached such a stage that a 
comprehensive understanding of the principles of damage control is an essential 
part of the training of the young, as well as the experienced, naval officer.16 
 
                                                 
13 McBride, Technological Change, 194. 
14 Reynolds, Command of the Sea, 483. 
15 Detail Specifications for Building Aircraft Carrier No. 5--YORKTOWN/No. 6 ENTERPRISE for the United 
States Navy. Pull slip RG19/470/30/11, Box 8-9 (Navy Department Bureau of Construction and Repair, February 15, 
1934), National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD [hereinafter cited as NACP]. 
16 G C Manning and T L Schumacher, Principles of Warship Construction and Damage Control (Annapolis: 
United Stated Naval Institute, 1924, 1928, 1930, 1935, reprinted 1939 with corrections), x. 
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It is indicative of the unforeseen significance of American aircraft carriers that the extent 
of information dedicated to that vessel type is so miniscule.  Strikingly, in Principles, aircraft 
carriers follow battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines in the discussion.  Only monitors, 
a simplified warship, follow carriers in the damage control book.  Indeed, there is a 20 page 
chapter devoted to submarines in Principles.17  Meanwhile, with only peacetime experiences 
with Langley, Lexington, Saratoga and Ranger available at the time of publication, carriers bore 
mentioning only as an afterthought following battleship rules.  In a nod to future developments, 
the authors recognized that the “protection of aircraft carriers is not as yet clearly established.”  
They continued “It is possible, if not probable, that aircraft carrier protection will eventually 
equal that now given battleships.”18   Carriers would come to dominate the seas in critical battles 
fought with aircraft.  The airplanes flown from carriers would carry armor piercing bombs for 
dive bombing and deadly torpedoes to penetrate the opposing ship’s side plating to cause 
flooding of internal spaces.  To lessen the impact of damages, the watertight design of the CV5 
was critical as were the trained DC crews positioned in multiple areas of the ship.19  These men 
were poised to act quickly in times of danger.  They were to battle water intrusion and reduce 
dangers from spreading fires after ignition of combustibles within the vessel.  Combustibles and 
vapors on warships were an issue as Parshall and Tully state in their seminal work on Midway 
and the downfall of Japan’s Kido Butai.20   
Damage-control lockers themselves contained wood beams for shoring, and 
additional shoring material was usually stowed in the overheads of 
companionways and anywhere else sufficient space could be found. [... Ships had 
                                                 
17
 Manning and Schumacher, Principles of Warship Construction, 367-386. 
18 Ibid, 258.  The Essex-class carriers were not authorized by the Naval Expansion Act until May 1938.  By 
Pearl Harbor, eleven Essex-class carriers were authorized for construction with two more added immediately after. 
19 See Appendix B for the Yorktown’s damage control transverse bulkhead and deck configuration.  The figures 
also show the locations of the five area-centric Damage Control teams, as well as critical other locations for DC. 
20 Kido Butai was the Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) First Air Fleet during World War II.  It was comprised of 
aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu with their respective fighter, dive bomber and torpedo attack bomber 
aircraft.  The Kido Butai along with two other IJN carriers, the Zuikaku and Shokaku, had attacked Pearl Harbor. 
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large amounts] of paper—reports, forms, charts, manuals, and blueprints [...] Far 
and away the worst fire hazard for carriers, though, was their aircraft fueling 
system.21   
 
Stanford Linzey was a second class petty officer onboard the Yorktown during the battle 
of Midway.  He was a musician in the ship’s band, but during times of enemy threat, he was 
assigned to DC Repair Party IV as a sound powered telephone talker for communication between 
the DC crew and Damage Control central operating station. 22  The sound powered phone that 
Linzey used was fully capable of communication even after onboard power loss.  Linzey said   
Repair parties are located throughout the ship to assess and repair damage to the 
ship afloat and steaming.  They fight fires, shore up bulkheads, patch holes, keep 
firefighting equipment operating, keep electrical systems operable, and the 
like....Prior to battle, I thought the task would be nearly impossible, because I had 
to remember frame and hatch numbers plus other commands back and forth.  No 
mistakes were allowed.  However, once the battle began, I was surprised at how 
easily it came after all the training and practice.  ... During the battle, the men lie 
on or sit on the deck.  If they were to stand up, they could break their necks on the 
overheads if the ship were to lurch violently due to explosions.23 
 
Yorktown CV5 had five area-centric damage control teams spread through the ship, plus 
one gasoline repair party for ship wide coverage of gasoline fires.  Before the war, it was debated 
whether the full DC outfitting of the fifth crew was even necessary.  The commanding officer of 
Enterprise (sister ship to Yorktown) stated the significance of outfitting the deck lockers for 
Repair (DC) V.24 Concurrence was forwarded by Admiral William F. Halsey, as commander of 
Carrier Division TWO.25 Consequently, BuC&R issued an approval for addition of the locker 
                                                 
21 Parshall\Tully, Shattered Sword,  244. 
22 Roman numerals will be used to identify the DC repair team(s) unless a quotation from a source specifically 
used Arabic numbers.  A DC repair team is also referred to as a repair party or DC team. 
23 Standford E. Linzey, USS Yorktown at Midway: The Sinking of the USS Yorktown (CV-5) and the Battles of 
the Coral Sea and Midway (Maitland, FL: Xulon Press, 2004), 86-87. 
24
 CO USS Enterprise CV6 to Chief BuC&R, Subject: Damage Control Gear Locker for Repair V (Engineer 
Repair Party), December 21, 1938, Serial CV6/S29 (50-tro) (1467), Bureau of Construction and Repair Confidential 
Files 1925-1940 CV5-6/S88-2 to CV6/S88-3, RG19, Box 81 [hereinafter cited as BuC&R Confidential 1925-1940], 
National Archives Building, Washington, D.C. [hereaftercited as NAB].   
25 CO Carrier Division TWO, Subject:  Damage Control Locker for Repair V, April 19, 1939, serial S29/FF11-
2 05-Br Serial No. 099, BuC&R Confidential 1925-1940, RG19, Box 81, NAB. 
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and its outfitting for DC station V.26  Ironically, DC Repair V on Yorktown would suffer a tragic 
end at the battle of Coral Sea as will be seen later in this analysis. 
Having multiple DC crews at various locations throughout the ship necessitated close 
coordination to prevent overlaps and wasted efforts.  “Communication facilities adequate to 
permit the Damage Control Officer to assume proper control of the damage control activities” 
became the emphasis as early as 1933. The same correspondence reinforced the importance of 
streamline communication in ballasting for stability  with “fourteen different manifolds, each in a 
separate compartment [...] It appears essential, therefore, that complete communication facilities 
be furnished from the central station (Damage Control Officer) to each of these manifolds as 
well as to the repair parties on the damage control deck.”27 
Admiral Halsey emphasized damage control coordination and communication when he 
sent a message to the Bureau of Ships (BuShip)28 which required consolidation of fueling and 
ballasting officers in the damage control central office.  This colocation facilitated both stability 
of the vessel and transfer of fuel and ballast during DC operations.  The close coordination 
reduced the chance of lost ship stability following damages to fuel tanks bounded by the shell of 
the ship.  In Halsey’s correspondence he stated that for communication of repair priorities and 
reduction of command conflicts “In accordance with the existing damage control instructions [...] 
                                                 
26 BuC&R to BuEng, Subject:  U.S.S. YORKTOWN and U.S.S. ENTERPRISE—Damage Control Locker for 
Repair V, May 20, 1939, Serial CV6/S88-3(C&DC)—CV5/S88-3, BuC&R Confidential 1925-1940, RG 19, Box 
81, NAB. 
27 Superintending Constructor, U.S.N. to BuC&R, Subject: CV5 and CV6 Proposed Damage Control Systems, 5 
December 1935, Serial CV5&6/S1-1-2, Bureau of Construction and Repair General Correspondence 1925-1940 
CV4/S 92 to CV5 & 6 A6, RG 19, Box 1709 [hereinafter cited as BuC&R General 1925-1940], NAB. 
28 The Bureau of Ships (BuShips) resulted from the merger of the Bureau of Construction and Repair (BuC&R) 
along with the Bureau of Engineering in 1940.  The US Navy agency is responsible for oversight of design and 
construction of naval ships in government and civilian shipyards. 
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In the YORKTOWN class the use of central [DC] station with its superior communication 
facilities [...] is superior to other possible locations.”29 
Additionally, damage control and ship survivability benefitted from small but critical 
changes in various details.  Emergency breathing gear improvements, flight deck repair 
equipment upgrades, and addition of quick acting scuttles30 in watertight or gastight hatches are 
evidence of DC enhancements.  For instance, the increase in emergency breathing equipment for 
each of Yorktown’s repair (damage control) parties improved repair party survivability. 31  This 
would be essential for providing oxygen to firefighters in heavy smoke areas.  Another example 
is the added equipment for transferring fuel and aviation gas to quickly defuel onboard aircraft 
for CV5.  The Yorktown CO recommended this reform.32  Elimination of this highly combustible 
gasoline would benefit the firefighters later after attack.  Fire containment was a vital success 
story for CV5 DC crews.   
The best defense is a good offense.  Thus, the Yorktown had combat air patrols of F4F-4 
fighters as the first line of protection.  CV5 also had an arsenal of defensive weaponry to shoot 
down attacking enemy aircraft.  Upgraded since its original design but still in transition to more 
sophisticated weaponry, Yorktown had eight 5”/38 caliber guns, four Quad 1.1 inch mounts, and 
twenty four 20 mm machine cannons.  Further, CV5 had a technologically advanced radar (the 
CXAM prototype) and communications equipment to coordinate the ship’s defense.33  The DC 
crews were the last line of defense to save CV5.  They nearly succeeded at Midway. 
                                                 
29 Commander Aircraft, Battle Force U.S.S. YORKTOWN, Flagship to Chief BuShips, Subject: CV5 and CV6 
Telephone System, 29 October 1940, Serial S71/23-Tn/FF2-3, Bureau of Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945 
to C-CV5-6/S1 to CV5/L9, RG19/1266/710 [hereinafter cited as BuShips General 1940-1945], NACP. 
30 A scuttle is a fast opening watertight manway.  Here, it is inserted into a large watertight hatch for fast access. 
31 Bureau of Ships to et al., Subject: CV5 and CV6 Hull Allowance List, 9 April 1941, Serial CV5/L7, 
CV6/L7(ME), RG19/1266/710, BuShips General 1940-1945, NACP. 
32 CO USS Yorktown CV5 to Chief of BuShips, Subject: CV5 Alteration Request No. 1-42, February 11, 1942, 
Serial CV5/S15/L9-3/(MEA-95-Me),  RG19/1266/710, BuShips General 1940-1945, NACP. 
33 Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, 97.  
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Chapter 2—Battle of Coral Sea and Pearl Harbor Repairs  
Admiral Jackie Fisher, the First Sea Lord of England in the early twentieth century, was 
tasked with standardizing and modernizing the Royal Navy.  In the process, he proclaimed that 
“Speed is Armor.”34  The battle of Coral Sea highlighted Captain Elliot Buckmaster’s 
seamanship as he avoided eight Japanese torpedoes, using Yorktown’s maneuverability and speed 
as an effective means to avoid damage.35  Bill Roy, ship’s photographer, observed “Captain 
Buckmaster go out on [...] the bridge [the ship’s island] and give orders for hard to starboard 
[turn right] or hard to port [turn left ... he] ...was one of the greatest seamen.”36  According to 
Stanford Linzey, “Captain Buckmaster had been a destroyer skipper as a junior officer, and in 
the battle of the Coral Sea, he handled the large carrier as if it were a small destroyer [...] in spite 
of its huge size, the Yorktown dodged and missed all [eight Japanese] torpedoes.”37  Linzey 
described Buckmaster as “respected by the officers and men [...] having escaped the torpedo 
attack.38 
Although all the torpedoes missed the ship, there was one direct aerial bomb hit on 
Yorktown.   Importantly, there was a near miss by a bomb off the ship’s port side.39  The former 
caused significant internal damages while the latter split the exterior plating of the carrier open 
and damaged internal back up structure that gave the shell its strength.  The hull of the CV5 was 
contained on the exterior by the shell plating. The shell plating kept the internal hull watertight.  
To provide strength to the exterior of the hull (the shell plating), there were frames, bulkheads, 
and decks internally.  The shell on a ship is only as strong as the internal backup structure behind 
                                                 
34 Quoted in McBride, Technological Change, 111.   The First Sea Lord was senior uniformed head of the 
Royal Navy, but worked for the civilian First Lord of the Admiralty. 
35 Buckmaster would earn a Navy Distinguished Service Medal for his command at Coral Sea and Midway.    
36 Bill Roy interview The National World War II Museum, http://www.ww2online.org/, 25 August 2015 
[hereinafter cited as Roy interview, NWWIIM]. 
37 Linzey, USS Yorktown, 88-89. 
38 Ibid, 101. 
39 The BuShip look at Coral Sea damages is shown in Appendix C—Figure C1.   
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it.  If that internal structure is collapsed or weakened, as was the case with the near miss on the 
port side of Yorktown at Coral Sea, the shell is weak and subject to failure in a battle condition.  
The role that the shell damage played in Yorktown’s demise will be investigated later.  Another 
near miss on the ship’s starboard side was inconsequential.40   
Roy saw the bomb that was a direct hit.  He observed that “one bomb did go down to the 
4th Level and [it] killed about 44 [men in a] ship repair party with flash suits and tools.”41  
According to Stanford Linzey, who was serving in DC Repair Party IV, “most of Repair Party 5 
was wiped out [...further] had that one bomb fallen only a few feet abaft [to the rear of] Repair 
Party 5, it would have fallen on [...] Repair Party 4, and [they] would have been the ones to 
suffer the casualties.”42  Linzey described the DC actions in this area of the ship.  He said 
“Planking was placed over the hole in the compartment so we could walk back and forth to carry 
out our duties.  The pungent smell of burnt flesh, sweet and nauseous, was sickening.”43  In 
assessing the local damage, he said “Bulkheads were damaged, watertight doors were blown off 
their hinges, and fires were burning in the stores compartments.  Smoke filled our section of the 
ship.  Electric cables had been severed, so we were in complete darkness.”44 
In his “War Damage Report” on the battle of Coral Sea, Buckmaster states 
Action taken to localize effects- Since the ship’s shell had not been pierced nor 
ruptured by the [direct hit] explosion, fire and internal flooding were the major 
effect to immediately control.  Prompt action by the hangar repair party in quickly 
using fire hoses down through the bomb hole in the hangar and No. 2 elevator pit 
quickly brought the fire below deck under control.  The Engineer Repair Party, 
Repair 5[...] was completely wiped out with the exception of several wounded 
men.  The Midship Repair Party, Repair 4, sent a fire party with rescue breathers 
into the [Repair V] smoke filled damaged compartment[...] cleared the wreckage 
                                                 
40 CO USS Yorktown CV5 to Chief of BuShips, Subject: “War Damage Report” dated  20 May 1942, serial 
CV5/S88/A9/(CEA-50-swg), Pull Slip RG19/470/30/15/04, Boxes 80-81, Records of the Bureau of Ships, War 
Damage Reports and Related Records, 1942-1949 (hereinafter cited as War Damage Reports 1942-1949), NACP. 
41 Bill Roy interview, The National World War II Museum. 
42 Linzey, USS Yorktown, 91. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, 90. 
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and personnel casualties, then sent a man through the bomb hole down into 
[another compartment] where he extinguished the smoldering stores.  The 
sprinkler damage control system in [that area] though badly twisted and ruptured 
by splinters assisted in quenching the storeroom fire[...] The damaged [electrical] 
circuits caused several repairmen to suffer from slight shocks until the circuits 
were cut at the Distribution Board.45 
 
The “near miss” on the port side was more consequential to CV5 seaworthiness.  The 
United States Navy had conducted trials in the interwar period to determine the feasibility of 
successful aerial attack against warships.  In 1920, the German Ostfriesland with nearly 2” of 
armored deck could not withstand direct bomb hits.46   Nevertheless, because of Treaty 
limitations, aircraft carriers for the US had no armor decks.  More germane, the dangers of a near 
miss were identified as far back as 1924 when bombs were dropped near the battleship 
Washington “to evaluate the effect of underwater explosions caused by near misses of aerial 
bombs.  Because of their intense pressure wave, the [near misses] were considered more 
dangerous [emphasis added] than direct hits.”47  This was shown on the port side of Yorktown at 
Coral Sea where the side shell plating and rivets were ripped apart.  The ship’s longitudinal 
torpedo bulkheads limited flooding.  That extra protection inboard of the shell acted as a buffer 
between any shell penetrations and flooding of internal work spaces.  The shattered internal shell 
support structure could not be replaced in a limited drydock duration.  Commander in Chief 
Pacific Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz had directed Yorktown be seaworthy within 72 hours of 
arrival at Pearl Harbor.  Nimitz had to provide as many deck loads of aircraft as he could against 
the projected Japanese onslaught at Midway.  There was no time for Yorktown to linger in the 
dry dock at Pearl Harbor.  As a consequence, critical internal support never saw repair.  There 
was simply insufficient time to do the total repair job.   
                                                 
45 War Damage Reports, NACP. 
46 Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, 83. 
47 McBride, Technological Change, 147.   
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In Buckmaster’s after action report on Coral Sea, he provided the Figure 2 illustration. 
 
Figure 2- Damage to CV5 port shell with lost rivets shown in bold (from NACP) 
 
In that same report, Buckmaster described Yorktown’s portside damage shown in Figure 2 stating 
One near miss from a bomb of weight estimated between 500 and 1000 lbs. 
released by a dive bomber exploded below the surface about twenty feet outboard 
of the hull abreast frame 110, port side.48  The three outboard fuel tanks [...] 
extending from frame 99 to frame 117, and filled with fuel, developed leaks to the 
sea.  Investigation by a diver revealed that the outer plating had been sprung and 
pushed in at the first riveted lap joint below the armor belt.  The major damaged 
area of ... shell plating extends from Frame 109 to frame 115, a fore and aft length 
of 24 feet.  Rivets in the lap joint in the damaged area are either sheared or blown 
completely out.49 
 
Captain Buckmaster’s after action recommendations received a mixed reaction.50  BuShip 
provided an alternate rescue breathing gear.  The Bureau disagreed with providing added 
compressed air pumps to overcome loss of electricity because air system piping was vulnerable 
                                                 
48 A frame can be likened to a rib of a ship.  The keel is the spine of a ship. 
49 CO USS Yorktown CV5 to Chief of BuShips, Subject: “War Damage Report” 20 May 1942, serial 
CV5/S88/A9/(CEA-50-swg), Pull Slip RG19/470/30/15/04 Boxes 80-81, War Damage Reports 1942-1949, NACP.  
50 Ibid. 
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to battle injury and too costly to install.  The suggestion for anti-flash gear for the DC crews was 
accepted with a 105% allowance for the repair crews.  Deferral of rubber boots for DC crewmen 
to avoid electrical shock resulted from a short supply of rubber.  The color variation for 
compartment light panels aided in controlling electrical power shocks for DC crewmen.  Ship’s 
crew would be assigned to paint the panels.51  
While Yorktown sailed back to Pearl Harbor for repairs, supervision of the Navy Yard 
repair crews began preparations to hastily patch the damages.  DC crews and other ship’s force 
members had begun the arduous task of damage removal and clean up.  Cleaning of the fuel in 
the tanks where the near miss bomb had ruptured the shell had to be completed before the arrival 
in Pearl Harbor.  First, the fuel had to be pumped out of the damaged and adjacent areas, and 
then the fuel vapors removed through force draft ventilation.  There could be no burning or 
welding in those tanks unless the vapors were removed.  To do otherwise might risk an explosion 
of disastrous consequence.  In those tanks, as well as decks and bulkheads damaged by the bomb 
hits, uneven plate surfaces were cropped away to temporarily cover with wood until steel plates 
could be laid on top with steel support installed underneath the plating at the dry dock at Pearl.  
The shell seams on the port side in way of the near miss were another issue.  Because of the 
urgency to get Yorktown back on line before the battle at Midway, rivets could not be reinstalled.  
To expedite the repair, it was necessary to weld in lieu of riveting the damaged steel.  Welding is 
much quicker and involves less manpower than riveting; however, this repair shortcut resulted in 
the creation of a weakness in the restored shell plating.  The chemical element composition of 
the plating being rejoined was not necessarily conducive to good weld penetration.  In fact, the 
lapped shell plate fillet welding and rivet plug welding performed were simply stopgap methods 
                                                 
51 BuShips U.S.S. Yorktown Bomb Damage May 8, 1942, War Damage Report No. 23, 28 November 1942, Pull 
Slip RG19/470/30/15/04 Boxes 80-81 [hereinafter cited as BuShips Damage Report, 28 November 1942], War 
Damage Reports 1942-1949, NACP. 
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used to expedite tightness on the ship.  Welding strength is normally dependent on steel having 
low carbon content.  With the riveting process, there is a mechanical rather than welded bond so 
that the carbon content is not as critical.  As a result, the port side repairs, although visually 
acceptable, would not be strong.  A full penetration butt weld on shell plate is preferable to a 
fillet weld.  Both of these two weld types would be superior to a poorly bonded lap weld as was 
likely the situation with the quickly repaired 24’ of shell plating on Yorktown’s port side.  The 
lapped shell repair seen in Figure 3 lower right would be subject to failure in combat.52  The 
duration of the repair would only be sufficient until the first instance of another near miss or 
direct hit in the vicinity of the repaired shell plating.  Either of those circumstances would result 
in a reopening of the gash on the ship’s side. 
 
Figure 3-Butt welds are superior to either lap or fillet welds (from Welding Fundamentals, 5th Edition) 
 
                                                 
52 William H. Minnick, Welding Fundamentals, 5th Edition, 2008 (Goodheart-Wilcox, On-line Publisher. 
http://www.g-wonlinetextbooks.com/gas-metal-arc-welding-handbook-2008), 63, 64 and 66 (accessed October 25, 
2015). 
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Figure 4 will show an initial rivet process similar to that used to mechanically join the 
Yorktown’s shell plate.53   The lower right of Figure 4 shows a theorized type of repair possible 
within the CINCPAC time constraint for the many lost rivets requiring repair in just one or two 
days in the Pearl Harbor drydock.   The ring welding was subject to cracking (failure).  To 
comply with the urgency of Admiral Nimitz directive, the solution was to dispense with a four 
man crew to repair a rivet for one welder to repair the missing rivet.  Welding would save time at 
the expense of the longevity of the repair. 
 
Figure 4- Initial rivet process versus potential quick rivet repair (from Repair Techniques of Riveted Vessels) 
 
Additionally, removal and subsequent replacement of internal support structure damaged 
by the portside near miss concussion and concave effect on the shell never happened due to time 
constraints.  Nevertheless, at Pearl Harbor’s Dry Dock “Hundreds of men [...] swarmed over the 
Yorktown—she seemed even more alive out of the water than afloat.  Clouds of smoke poured up 
                                                 
53 San Francisco Maritime National Park Association: Repair Techniques of Riveted Vessels. July 7, 1997. 
http://www.maritime.org/conf/conf-dvorak.htm  (accessed October 18, 2015). 
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from the acetylene torches burning away her damaged plates.  The clatter of drills and hammers 
never stopped.”54  Indeed to show how critical the deadline was “[t]here was no time for plans or 
sketches.  The men worked directly with the steel beams and bars brought on the ship.  Coming 
to a damaged frame, burners would take out the worst of it; fitter would line up a new section, 
[and] cut it to match.”55   
The BuShip report on the CV5 repair at Pearl Harbor stated:  
The vessel was available at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, for slightly more than 
48 hours to allow temporary repairs.  During this period, demolished and 
damaged structure was replaced by material having equivalent weight, strength 
and [geometric properties].  In way of the near-miss damage to the port side, 
frames and transverse floors between the shell and number 1 bulkhead [torpedo 
bulkhead] were not replaced as enough material remained to hold the shell in 
place.  The shell was repaired by caulking and welding the leaky seam and 
rivets...56 
 
The BuShip report goes on to state “All watertight doors and hatches below the main deck were 
repaired and tested for watertightness... [and] ...all essential watertight boundaries on second 
deck and below were restored.”57  
Stanford Linzey stated “Work on the ship ... continued around the clock.  Welders with 
torches, electricians, and hull technicians swarmed like ants over, around, and under the great 
ship to try to put us back in battle order.”58  After the massive repair effort, 
Yorktown came out of the dry dock as scheduled.  The hull had been repaired, the 
third deck had been patched, the electrical systems were spliced, and the 
watertight doors and hatches had been replaced.  However, three boilers [of nine] 
still were left inoperable because there was not enough time to repair them.59 
 
                                                 
54 Walter Lord, Incredible Victory: The Battle of Midway. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1967), 36. 
55 Ibid. 
56 BuShips Damage Report, 28 November 1942, War Damage Reports 1942-1949, NACP. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Linzey, USS Yorktown, 102 
59 Ibid. 
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Yorktown’s speed would not be an advantage for Buckmaster at Midway.60  Linzey and 
the crew knew “Buckmaster had saved our lives by [...] maneuvering the great ship and 
avoiding the torpedoes, but now we were underpowered and incapable of such action.  
[We hoped] the battle would end before the Japanese would locate our damaged ship.”61 
Ian Toll succinctly summarized the Yorktown repair when he said, Pearl Harbor “would 
meet the deadline not by completing the needed repairs quickly, but by not doing them at all [...] 
It was an interim patch-up job rather than a proper restoration of the ship, but the Yorktown 
would be battleworthy for the coming campaign.”62  Although nominally “battleworthy” after 
Pearl Harbor repairs, CV5 survivability under a severe attack would be problematic.  The port 
shell repairs were vulnerable as can be seen in Figure 5 where the shell plating is concave after 
removal of internal support.63  Midway would put the CV5 DC crews to their ultimate test. 
 
Figure 5- Pearl Harbor quick repair of damaged concave port side shell (photo from NACP) 
                                                 
60 According to Buckmaster’s after action report, boilers #7, 8, and 9 were secured and out of commission due 
to the direct bomb hit at Coral Sea.  The noxious smoke and gases plus burner flarebacks resulted from the effect of 
the concussion.  Time limitations in the Pearl Harbor dry dock prevented the repair of the three boilers. 
61 Linzey, USS Yorktown, 106-107 
62 Toll, Pacific Crucible, 397 
63 BuShips Damage Report, 28 November 1942, War Damage Reports 1942-1949, NACP. 
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Chapter 3—Battle of Midway and the Loss of Yorktown 
The battle of Midway in early June 1942 would represent one of the US Navy’s greatest 
victories.  The island of Midway stood as an unsinkable aircraft carrier with over one hundred 
various Marine, Army and Navy aircraft stationed there.  There were three US carriers, 
Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet facing four Kido Butai IJN carriers with their skilled crews 
and airmen.  Yorktown played a pivotal role in the first day as its airmen led by Lieutenant 
Commander Maxwell Leslie sank one of the Japanese carriers outright.64  The Enterprise flyers 
sank two more IJN carriers thus leaving only one enemy carrier against three US carriers.  The 
odds had turned in the favor of the USN.   Had Yorktown not been repaired at Pearl and appeared 
off Midway, the odds after the first morning would have been much different.  Two capable 
Japanese carriers would have faced two American carriers with one, the Hornet, being new to the 
battlefront and thus inexperienced except for the daring 1942 raid on Tokyo.  Hornet’s air group 
did not even find Kido Butai on the first morning except for the ill-fated Torpedo Squadron VT8. 
VT8 lost all of its 15 aircraft and all but one of its airmen in its bold torpedo run on the IJN. 
Nevertheless, after the American morning attack of June 4, 1942, the surviving Japanese 
carrier Hiryu launched a retaliatory attack later in the same day.  In so doing, the assault was 
uncoordinated.  Instead of using dive bombers in collaboration with torpedo aircraft, the dive 
bombers were sent ahead of the torpedo planes.  The first carrier sighted was the Yorktown.   
Stanford Linzey heard the call for action stations and “All of us ran to our battle stations 
on the double [...] ‘Set material condition to affirm,’ said the speaker.  That meant close all 
                                                 
64 According to Military Times: Hall of Valor. n.d. http://valor.militarytimes.com/about.php  (accessed October 
17, 2015) [hereinafter cited as Hall of Valor] “Max” Leslie was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions at Midway.  
Leslie’s VB3 along with John “Jimmie” Thatch’s VF3 from Saratoga were assigned to Yorktown after Coral Sea.  
The USN manpower flexibility sharply contrasted with the IJN.  The Zuikaku did not participate in Midway because 
its airmen were decimated at Coral Sea.  Replacement IJN crews from the damaged Shokaku could have augmented 
her sister ship to replace its lost airmen, but they were not transferred.  Footnote 68 will show USN crew flexibility 
with the rapid replacement of Yorktown’s lost Repair Party V prior to Midway. 
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watertight doors and hatches against flooding and cut off all ventilation.  Put on flash-proof 
clothing.”65  Then the Japanese dive bombers came.  Suddenly, “the ship lurched beneath us as 
three bombs hit [...] and there were several near misses that shook us hard.  One bomb set a fire 
on the hanger deck and another exploded right in the stack and snuffed out the fires in the 
boilers, putting them out of commission”66 (see Appendix C—Figure C2). 
Parshall and Tully paint a graphic picture when they explain that 
Yorktown was crippled, drifting, with thick clouds of black smoke trailing from 
her innards.  Her fires were serious, with damage-control parties busy in several 
places belowdecks.  Down in her engine spaces, workmen were trying their best 
to bring at least some of her boilers back on line, despite the damage to her 
uptakes.  Yorktown’s flight deck was also holed from bomb hits, and crews were 
scurrying to jury-rig patches using wooden beams and steel plates to cover her 
wounds [see Figure 1].  All in all, she was a mess.67 
 
According to the CO, the Flight Deck Repair crew patched the holes from the direct hits.  
Fires were nearly all put out by Repair I, II, III and VII68 by an hour and a half after the dive 
bombing. The water curtain system in the hangar deck had worked well.  CV5 had been making 
25 knots prior to the attack.  With the boilers extinguished by bombs hitting the exhaust uptakes, 
it took the engineering repair crew just one hour to get her back up to 23 knots, a moderate yet 
respectable speed.69   Bill Roy remembered that the repair party patched the flight deck by using 
temporary underdeck structure and a plate lying on top of the deck resulted in only a “bump” on 
the flight deck for the aviators.70  The deck was ready for business again in less than one hour 
after the attack.  Linzey said “As we lay dead in the water, the engineers worked feverishly and 
                                                 
65 Linzey, USS Yorktown, 112. 
66 Linzey, USS Yorktown, 113. 
67 Parshall\Tully. Shattered Sword, 298.  
68 Yorktown originally had six damage control crews (five area-centric and one for gasoline fires).  It is likely 
that the loss of Repair V at Coral Sea due to the direct bomb hit resulted in a temporary Repair VII being mobilized. 
69 CO USS Yorktown CV5 to Chief of BuShips, Subject: War Damage Report, 18 June 1942, serial CV5/A16-3 
(CCR-10-per) [hereinafter cited as CO War Damage], War Damage Reports and Related Records, 1942-1949, pull 
slip RG19/470/30/15/04 Box 80-81 [hereinafter cited as Damage Records 1942-1949], NACP 
70 Roy interview, NWWIIM. 
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cross-connected the steam plant [and ...] we were able to get underway again.”71  Boilers were up 
and the ship was capable of 23 knots compared to full ahead of 30-33 knots--nearly two thirds 
speed.72  With fires extinguished, the flight deck patched, and air operations underway,  to the 
Japanese torpedo bombers that vectored in on CV5 half an hour later, she appeared to be an 
unmolested American target—a carrier that had not endured attack as of yet.  As Parshall and 
Tully state, “[Yorktown] certainly wasn’t burning, and [...the Japanese torpedo flight leaders] 
justifiably assumed that this was indeed an undamaged enemy necessitating their attention.”73   
Buckmaster set Condition Affirm. 74  The CO stated that between the dive bombers and 
the torpedo attack “all repair parties returned to their stations [...] dispersed and rested flat on the 
deck.”75  As enemy planes approached, Yorktown’s Executive Officer (XO) I.D. Wiltsee reported 
“all gasoline in the topside gasoline lines was pumped back down to the gasoline tanks in a very 
short time before the attack actually took place.  [...Thus,] a CO₂ purging system for the topside 
gasoline lines and a CO₂ blanket for the gasoline tank compartments” prevented a serious 
conflagration. 76  The crew of Yorktown had learned from the loss of the Lexington at Coral Sea 
that gasoline vapors had to be controlled.  Like CV5’s DC crews at both Coral Sea and Midway, 
Lexington’s firefighters had  
descended into that hellish world, dragging long hoses behind them.  They wore 
masks against the smoke, breathed from portable oxygen tanks, carried flashlights 
to light the way, and when the water pressure in their hoses failed, they turned 
handheld chemical extinguishers on the advancing flames.  The sweat ran into 
                                                 
71 Linzey, USS Yorktown, 113.  
72 A knot is equal to 1.15 statute miles per hour.  As a result, after the boilers were brought back on line, 
Yorktown was making 26 miles per hour compared to a full ahead pace of 34 to 40 miles per hour. 
73 Parshall\Tully, Shattered Sword,  312. 
74 Condition Affirm (or Afirm as Buckmaster referred to it) indicates to secure the ship for watertight condition.  
All watertight doors and openings were to be closed and tightened down to prevent flooding in case of damages. 
75 CO War Damage, War Damage Reports and Related Records, 1942-1949, pull slip RG19/470/30/15/04, Box 
80-81 [hereinafter cited as Damage Records 1942-1949], NACP 
76 XO to CO USS Yorktown CV5, Subject: Executive Officer’s Report of Action for Period of June 4-7, 1942, 
June 16, 1942, pull slip RG19/470/30/15/04, Box 80-81 [hereinafter cited as XO report], Damage Records 1942-
1949, NACP.  See Appendix D for the full Executive Officer’s report on the Midway CV5 shipboard action. 
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their eyes and they became light in the head—but they fought on, enduring the 
ovenlike heat, the choking smoke, and the constant threat of new explosions.77 
 
Yorktown’s repaired condition would have given the appearance to the Japanese that a 
second American carrier could be destroyed by the remnants of the Kido Butai air wing.  As the 
Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers approached, they used the “hammer and anvil” method of 
attack.  The Kates approached CV5 from forward on both the port and starboard sides.  Not only 
was Buckmaster’s seamanship challenged with reduced speed, but there was a more coordinated 
enemy torpedo attack to fend off.  The result was that two torpedoes slammed into the port side 
of the ship near frames 80 and 92 (see Appendix C—Figure C3).  Two huge gashes were torn in 
the port side plus the 24 foot zipper torn by the near miss on the ship’s port side at Coral Sea also 
opened up considering the lack of strength in the welded lapped plating.  Buckmaster reported 
“frame 70 to [...] 110 open to the sea.”78  Major flooding immediately became a problem as the 
port side of the ship settled into the water.  Bill Roy said there was “Chaos [...] the ship rocked 
right out of the water [... and] the ship started listing.”79  Stanford Linzey recalled “the thudding 
of the two torpedoes as they struck us on the port (left) side.  I was down on the third deck at 
water level when they blasted the side of our ship and ripped huge holes in our hull [...] the ship 
lifted into the air.”  Nevertheless, exiting through the darkened and slanted ship, the men were 
“[w]ell trained for such a calamity, we helped each other find our way to the surface.80 
With no steam or electric power to counter the flooding, Captain Buckmaster discussed 
the ship’s survival with Commander Clarence Aldrich, his DC officer.81 They were concerned 
that CV5 might unexpectedly capsize, so the captain gave the “abandon ship” order.  Yorktown’s 
                                                 
77 Toll, Pacific Crucible, 362. 
78 CO War Damage, Damage Records 1942-1949, NACP. 
79 Roy interview, NWWIIM 
80 Linzey, USS Yorktown,  24. 
81 Hall of Valor—Aldrich received the Silver Star as CV5 Damage Control Officer at the battle of Midway.   
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crew buttoned up the water tight enclosures as well as possible in evacuating the listing and dark 
ship.  It was at this point that the quick acting scuttles 
would save lives.  Designed into the heavy (and now often 
jammed) water tight hatches, the opening would enable 
endangered sailors to exit.  Where hatches could not be 
unfastened, scuttles provided emergency egress (see 
Figure 6).  Linzey ran into a jammed hatch.  “The 
watertight hatch to the second deck was warped shut by the 
explosions!”82  Without the design forethought for crew 
safety and ship survivability, Linzey and his shipmates might have been lost in this maze.  
“However, in the center of each watertight hatch there was a scuttle, a small circular quick-acting 
hatch that could be opened by the turn of a wheel....the first man got it open, and the rest of us 
climbed up through the manhole, each in turn, one at a time.”83  Single crewmen made their way 
through the tight but passable scuttles.  The design changes to incorporate scuttles into the 
hatches benefited damage control and crew rescue.  Likewise, the addition of gas masks to cover 
greater numbers of crewmen saved men from smoke inhalation.  Although powerless after the 
torpedo attack, the firefighting systems and DC crewmen had worked efficiently to remediate the 
previous damage from the dive bombers.  The crew of the Yorktown abandoned ship on the 
evening of June 6, 1942.  The crew and all those observing the carrier expected her to capsize 
and sink.  Task Force 17 and CINCPAC appointed Midway naval operations tactical 
commander, Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was aboard CV5.  He remarked in his after action 
report, the Yorktown crew “started abandoning ship in anticipation of her capsizing and [in 
                                                 
82 Linzey, USS Yorktown, 118. 
83 Ibid. 
Figure 6-CV5 quick acting scuttle in a 
watertight hatch (photo from NACP) 
24 
 
concern of] further enemy attacks.  About twenty three hundred survivors were picked up by 
destroyers.”84  Without effective damage control and DC related ship design, the number of CV5 
survivors could have been far less.  The injured carrier held on and stayed afloat. 
The next morning, June 7, 1942, Captain Buckmaster called for volunteers for a salvage 
party to return to the lifeless Yorktown and attempt to secure a tow back to Pearl for yet another 
repair effort.  There were 26 officers and 149 enlisted men who returned to their stricken ship as 
volunteers.  “They knew full well that she was barely seaworthy and would probably be the 
target of repeated submarine and air attacks during a journey of some 1,000 miles,” Yorktown’s 
Executive Officer stated.85  The XO named each of the officers and enlisted men who went back 
to their suffering ship to save her.86   As Bill Roy, who returned in the onboard group stated, 
“engineering officers and different disciplines to operate the ship signed up for the salvage 
party.”87  Roy remembers the “first order of business was to put out the fires persistently burning 
in the [... forward...] Rag Locker.  It was near the aviation gas storage, torpedo storage and bomb 
storage [...and...] any minute something could happen and you’re history.”88 
Parshall and Tully describe the progress made by the recovery party 
Yorktown’s fires were now out, and her port list had already been considerably 
abated by both portable pumps and counterflooding her starboard tanks.  Topside, 
men were cutting away many of her portside guns so as to reduce the weight on 
her threatened flank.  In the hangar, other sailors were lowering spare aircraft 
from the overheads and shoving them over the side.  Most important of all, 
minesweeper Vireo had secured a towline to Yorktown ... and was dragging her 
clear at three knots.  If things kept up, Captain Buckmaster might yet pull off one 
of the war’s more masterful demonstrations of damage control.89 
                                                 
84 Frank Jack Fletcher, Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942, Online Action Reports: Commander Cruisers, Pacific 
Fleet of 14 June 1942. June 14, 1942. http://www.history.navy.mil/research/archives/digitized-collections/action-
reports/wwii-battle-of-midway/commander-cruisers-pacific-fleet-report.html (accessed October 24, 2015). 
85 XO report, Damage Records 1942-1949, NACP. 
86 Appendix D is Yorktown Executive Officer Wiltsee’s report which individually names the officers and 
enlisted men who formed the volunteer salvage team. 
87 Roy interview, NWWIIM. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Parshall\Tully, Shattered Sword, 372-373. 
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Yorktown improved her list by 2° from the prior 26° with the use of temporarily powered 
pumps plus dewatering pumps from the destroyer Hammann.   The tug Vireo secured a line for 
tow toward Pearl and engineers worked on boilers.  The salvage party made progress.  The crew 
did not know that a Japanese submarine, the I-168, was lurking nearby and preparing a spread of 
torpedoes for a fatal attack on CV5.  When the torpedoes were seen, it was too late to react.  One 
hit the Hammann and split her in two.  As she sank, her depth charges detonated and created an 
underwater explosion that “shook Yorktown from stem to stern.”90  Although standing operating 
procedure required a crew to disarm depth charges while alongside another vessel, someone 
neglected to do so.  The explosion caused further damage to Yorktown’s exterior shell.   
The worst was yet to come.  Two more I-168 torpedoes struck Yorktown’s vulnerable 
bottom near the starboard turn of the bilge (see Appendix C—Figure C4).  Hitting near frames 
85 and 92, the ship now had been bracketed by five major shell plating intrusions scattered on 
both sides of the vessel near midship plus the effect of Hammann’s depth charge detonations.  
The five main transverse watertight bulkheads at frames 71, 82, 90, 98 and 106 were likely 
compromised on at least one if not both sides of the ship.  Even if the other 13 watertight and oil 
tight transverse bulkheads on the ship held tight, the center of the ship was fatally wounded.  The 
three foot innerbottom on starboard side near the turn of the bilge was not armored.  Torpedo 
damage was extensive.  No DC effort could save the ship from these mortal wounds.  Captain 
Buckmaster ordered the salvage crew off Yorktown and the tow to Pearl was abandoned.   
With the huge hole punched in the underside of the doomed ship, the ship’s longitudinal 
bulkheads in way of the boiler rooms likely experienced catastrophic collapse.91  Yorktown 
                                                 
90 Roy interview, NWWIIM. 
91 CO War Damage, Damage Records 1942-1949, NACP. 
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initially began to settle but then she took a heavier list to the portside.  Shortly afterward, the ship 
rolled and capsized.  Figure 7 is the photograph taken as the Yorktown capsized.  It shows the 
mortal wound to the bottom shell at the bilge. In viewing the photograph, it is evident that a huge 
hole has been blown in the bottom on the starboard side (the left side of the inverted hull in the 
picture).  A dark concave opening is clearly visible in way of the blown away bilge keel.  This is 
the result of the two I-168 torpedoes.   
 
Figure 7-Capsized Yorktown (photograph from The National World War II Museum) 
In a postmortem, BuShips concluded that the massive hole induced disastrous flooding 
into the ship’s starboard boiler rooms and adjacent spaces.  This is shown in yellow in Figure 8.   
 
Figure 8-Tank flooding resulting from I-168 attack shown in yellow (from NACP) 
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With numerous watertight enclosures compromised, Yorktown stood no chance of 
recovery after the submarine torpedoes unleashed their fury.  Like Titanic, long splits sink ships. 
CV5 would sink and settle upright at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean.  Decades after the battle, 
she was discovered by a National Geographic Society exploration party led by Robert Ballard, 
who also found Titanic on the sea floor.  Nearly in pristine condition in her watery grave, the 
deep gouge on her port side was evident.  The condition of the Yorktown on the ocean floor can 
be seen in the Figure 9 painting.  The painting is based on hundreds of photographic stills and 
high quality video recordings of the exploration in very clear water surrounding the Yorktown.  
The detailed examination “from stem to stern, from mudline to island top” occurred over three 
days in May 1998.  Figure 9 resulted from an artistic composite rendering of the multiple 
individual hydrographic surveys performed by Ballard and his team nearly sixty years after 
CV5’s sinking.92    
Figure 9- Yorktown after being sunk (Ken Marschall painting from Ballard, Return to Midway, 162-163.)  
                                                 
92 Robert D Ballard, Return to Midway (Washington: The National Geographic Society, 1999), 150-175. 
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Chapter 4—Damage Control Lessons Learned  
There were many lessons learned and DC changes introduced as a result of the loss of 
Yorktown.  The principle lesson included full training of ship’s crew in damage control tenets.   
Accumulating war experience emphasizes that the entire ship's company must be 
thoroughly educated in damage-control principles and methods, and must be 
properly trained to act in accordance with them. Action reports continue to 
illustrate that a ship can be lost because personnel outside of the main damage-
control organization fail to employ proper damage-control methods and 
procedures. All hands, from the Commanding Officer down, must be made 
thoroughly conversant with all phases of damage control which apply to their own 
ship. 93 
Land based formal training of firefighters became an important aspect for DC crews. The 
official US Navy World War II historian, Samuel Eliot Morison says, “Something more than 
courage—know how—was required to conquer fires.”  He goes on to show how DC efforts 
benefited throughout the duration of the war due to “the fire-fighting schools and improved 
techniques instituted by the Navy in 1942-1943.”  Former New York City fire department deputy 
chief, Lieutenant Harold J. Burke (USNR) and former Boston Fire Department member 
Lieutenant Thomas A. Kilduff (USNR) helped “train over 260 officer instructors and established 
schools at every continental naval base, and on several Pacific islands.”   Morison goes on to say 
that the instructors trained new damage control crews with an emphasis on getting “the fear of 
fire out of the sailor.” A confidence was instilled in the DC crewman that “if properly equipped 
with fire mask and helmet, handling an all-purpose nozzle and applicator, he could boldly 
advance to the source of a blaze and not get hurt.”94  
 Another DC technique instituted for purging gasoline lines with CO₂  prevented 
calamitous fires.  In his report on the Midway action, Admiral Nimitz stated “Gasoline fires in 
                                                 
93 Official Navy Handbook on Damage Control, 1945 http://www.hnsa.org/doc/dc  (accessed October 18, 2013), 
190. 
94 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Victory in the Pacific 
1945 Volume XIV (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1960), 98-99. 
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carriers are a serious menace, [his emphasis].  Yorktown, though hit by three bombs and set 
afire, had no gasoline fires, possibly because of the effective use of CO₂ in the gasoline 
system.”95  CO₂ purging (or inerting) of gasoline lines and tanks was adopted by the USN, thanks 
to CV5 Machinist Oscar Meyer’s innovative thinking at Midway.96  Nimitz also issued an order 
by the end of June 1942 that salvage parties were to be organized ahead of any need.   His order 
read: “In the event a ship receives such severe battle damage that abandonment may be a 
possibility, a skeletonized crew to effect rescue of the ship shall be ready either to remain on 
board or to be placed in an attendant vessel.”97 
Another lesson was the use of anti-flash gear by the DC crews.  Essex-class carriers 
entered service with more standardization of firefighting and other damage control parts and 
equipment including improved rescue breathing gear as they took over the Pacific.98  
Power and propulsion plant redundancy became important.  Increased ship armor and 
speed was introduced into the Midway class carriers for better protection.  Except for the 
Lexington CV2 and Saratoga CV3 (because of their unique design conversions to aircraft 
carriers from cruisers), no other prior carriers had the substantial power plants and armor as was 
designed into the Midway class.  The machinery was  
modern in design and arranged so as to gain the maximum resistance to 
derangement and battle damage. There are [...] boilers arranged in [independent] 
firerooms. Steam lines are such that the boilers in each fireroom can be connected 
to one main machinery unit so that the plant can be operated as four separate units 
[...] These carriers had [...] more effective damage control equipment.99 
                                                 
95 Chester Nimitz, Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942, Online Action Reports: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
Serial 01849 of 28 June 1942. June 28, 1942. http://www.history.navy.mil/research/archives/digitized-
collections/action-reports/wwii-battle-of-midway/04-07-jun-1942.html  (accessed September 14, 2015), 27 
96 XO Report, Damage Records 1942-1949, NACP. 
97 Quoted in Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. IV: Coral 
Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949), 156. 
98 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, 99. 
99 Scot MacDonald, Dept. of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, Naval Aviation Office: Evolution of Aircraft 
Carriers [electronic resource], 1997, http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/naval-aviation-
history/evolution-of-aircraft-carriers/the-early-attack-carriers.html, 47 (accessed July 18, 2015). 
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Further, better ship welding techniques, material, and qualifications became important in 
shipbuilding.  Not only would new techniques such as modular construction yield greater 
efficiencies, but welding quality and material composition control would produce more robust 
warships for the US Navy. 
Carrier DC crews were moved up to the hangar deck so as to be more efficiently located 
instead of traversing up and down stairs from below.  Four of the six DC teams on Yorktown had 
been located on the heavily compartmentalized Damage Control 3rd Deck.  This made lateral 
movement prior to descent or ascent into the damaged areas very difficult.  The hanger deck is 
open and easily traversed forward to aft in times of emergency.   
Additionally, temporary powered pumps and power generation equipment for use after 
loss of ship’s power became standard.  Fire retardant paints became standard to prevent fires 
from burning on oil base painted surfaces.    
The Navy learned solutions and implemented them after Yorktown’s experiences at Coral 
Sea and Midway.  Damage Control had minimized the loss of life on CV5 and left a legacy that 
reduced losses of American lives and US ships in the future.  
  
31 
 
Chapter 5—Conclusion 
Revisionist history is tempting.  There can be no doubt of the virtue of the decision to 
move Yorktown quickly through the Pearl Harbor drydock without completing all repairs.  The 
US victory at Midway is evidence of the soundness of that directive.  In retrospect, the Yorktown 
played an instrumental role in that outcome.  Had CV5 not survived Coral Sea and been repaired 
at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese carrier Soryu would have escaped the Dauntless dive bombers from 
Yorktown on the morning of June 4, 1942.  Battle odds after the US carrier morning attack would 
have been different.  Without efficient CV5 DC efforts at Midway after the IJN dive bomber 
attack, another US carrier may have been targeted.  Prior to the I-168 attack, it seemed that the 
salvage party stood a chance of returning their ship to the safety of Pearl Harbor.  As the 
Washington Post reported “...the Japanese already had paid an awful price for their attempt to 
bulge their power to the East.  But no man who saw the Yorktown will ever think they paid too 
much.”100  The CV5 DC crew helped win the unexpected victory over the Kido Butai and 
changed the course of the Pacific war.  For the loss of Yorktown and Hammann, plus 147 aircraft, 
the US navy sunk 4 IJN carriers and a heavy cruiser plus downed 322 of their best carrier planes.  
Those skilled Kido Butai pilots perished not only in the air but often in infernos aboard their 
carriers.  The Japanese lost 3,057 of their best experienced sailors and pilots; while the United 
States suffered only 362 casualties.101  IJN onboard fires, explosions and deaths were in stark 
contrast to the success achieved by CV5 DC. 
The USS Yorktown (CV5) damage control efforts contributed not only to the US victory 
at Midway but also aided in saving lives on their ship and—with lessons learned—even carriers 
and crews later in the Pacific war.  Those early lessons learned vis-à-vis damage control and the 
                                                 
100 “Last Moments of U.S.S. Yorktown, Sunk by Japs After Midway,” Washington Post, September 17, 1942, 8. 
101 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge 
and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 194. 
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subsequent Navy training programs that ensued helped improve US carrier survivability and 
reduce crew fatalities throughout the remainder of the Second World War.  This was particularly 
the case after the advent of kamikaze attacks on the US Pacific Fleet.  The USS Franklin (CV13) 
in March 1945 was a prime example of improved DC efforts.  She was recently commissioned 
and serving to support the Okinawa landings by bombarding the Japanese home islands.  A 
Japanese attack turned her flight deck and hanger, which were fully loaded with fueled and 
armed aircraft, into a blazing inferno.  BuShip would say CV13 experienced “the most severe 
[fire] survived by any U.S. warship during the course of World War II.”102  Morison agreed that 
Franklin “was by far the most heavily damaged carrier in the war—in much worse shape than 
Lexington at Coral Sea or Yorktown at Midway—to be saved.”103  Yet the Franklin was saved 
and later made port.  Damage control lessons were important to saving ships. 
The first responders on Yorktown fought for survival of their ship and nearly succeeded.  
The leadership on CV5 included Captain (soon promoted to Rear Admiral) Elliot Buckmaster, 
Executive Officer Commander Dixie Kiefer, his replacement (Kiefer was injured following the 
first abandon ship order) Navigator turned acting XO Commander Irving D. Wiltsie, and the 
First Lieutenant and Damage Control Officer Commander Clarence E. Aldrich. The United 
States Navy recognized each of them for their excellence.104   
                                                 
102 Quoted in Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, 232. 
103 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, 94-99.  
104 According to Hall of Valor, Buckmaster received the Navy Distinguished Service Medal with a Gold Star for 
actions at Coral Sea and Midway.  The Gold Star is affixed to a medal after the first award of that medal to indicate 
a second award of the same medal.  Kiefer was awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal for Coral Sea and 
the Navy Cross for Midway.  Wiltsie received the Silver Star for Midway actions as acting XO but, unfortunately 
died in November 1943 when, as CO, his escort carrier was sunk by a Japanese torpedo—his DC efforts earning him 
the Navy Cross.  Aldrich was awarded the Silver Star for Midway in which his citation states “he directed and led 
fire parties, extinguishing four serious fires below deck [...]  After the ship was attacked by torpedoes he continued 
calmly to furnish the captain with complete information on damage control although all lights in the ship were 
extinguished, and the compartment adjacent to his battle station in Central Station had been flooded as a result of a 
torpedo explosion.”  Along with Buckmaster and Wiltsie, Aldrich participated in salvage operations on CV5.  Note:  
The Medal of Honor is the highest ranked medal to be bestowed on a person in the Navy.  It is followed by the Navy 
Cross for gallantry and the Distinguished Service Medal for commendable service.  The Silver Star follows them. 
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Not only did the ship commanders perform well, but many of the crewmen and their 
superior officers were also recognized for their dedication to duty by the Yorktown XO in his 
after action report105 and then later cited by the Navy.  The critical boiler repairs within 25 to 30 
minutes after their fires were snuffed out by the IJN dive bombers, and then the subsequent 
steaming at approximately 23 knots could not have been accomplished without the men who 
manned boiler room #1.  With Lieutenant Commander John F. Delaney, Jr. in charge, his crew of 
Charles Kleinsmith, Clifton E. Snell, E.F. Janske, William A. Brewer, James W. Benton, Cecil 
D. Brooks, and R. Z. Ellison kept auxiliary power going in the stricken ship plus eventually 
attained sufficient speed to launch aircraft to defend against incoming IJN Kate torpedo bombers.  
Navy Crosses were awarded to Lieutenant Commander Delaney, Kleinsmith (posthumously) and 
Snell with others earning the Silver Star for their success with Yorktown’s boiler repairs under 
great stress with the overpowering smoke, gas and heat in the boiler room.106 
Launching defensive aircraft against the incoming torpedo planes would not have been 
possible without the boilers but most definitely required the flight deck repairs following three 
direct bomb hits penetrating that deck.  Flight operations were halted until the deck was repaired.  
In that regard, Lieutenant Commander Albert H. Wilson Jr. “was principally responsible for the 
YORKTOWN’S ability to launch planes in sufficient time to intercept a Japanese aerial torpedo 
attack.”  Additionally, Ensign Chester E. Briggs “repeatedly exposed himself to danger during a 
heavy bombing attack and was cool and courageous in repairing flight deck equipment while the 
attack was going on.”  Both these men received the Silver Star for their actions in bringing the 
flight deck back up operationally and helping to deter at least some of the Kates.107 
                                                 
105 XO Report, Damage Records 1942-1949, NACP. 
106 Hall of Valor. 
107 Ibid. 
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Many firefighters and each of the nearly 180 volunteer salvage crewmen were recognized 
individually by the XO.108  Two examples among the many are Lieutenant Commander Ernest J. 
Davis and Chief Machinist Mate Glyn D. Dillard.  Lieutenant Commander Davis was cited by 
the XO for cutting away and dropping overboard the heavy portside antiaircraft armaments as he 
“devised a plan which contributed greatly to the reduction of the ship’s dangerous list.”  Another 
laudable individual was Chief Machinist Mate Dillard who was cited for  
[d]irecting fire fighting efforts with calm courage and efficiency [... He] was 
largely responsible for the quick suppression of fires started by the explosion of 
enemy bombs.  Later, as a volunteer member of the salvage party which returned 
aboard the listing carrier, he entered holes cut through decks into a rag stowage 
space, where he labored tirelessly for six hours to extinguish a fire which had 
been burning for two days.109 
 
Davis and Dillard would be awarded the Silver Star for their admirable actions.   
Admiral Raymond Spruance best expressed the importance of the sacrifice that Yorktown 
made when he told Admiral Fletcher “If it had not been for what you did and took with the 
Yorktown, I am firmly convinced that we would have been badly defeated and the Japs would be 
holding Midway today.”110  Damage Control actions on Yorktown were commendable.  Lessons 
learned would save lives of sailors long after CV5 rested on the ocean floor.  Yorktown CV5 
Damage Control is an untold but vital story of naval action in the Pacific. 
  
                                                 
108 XO Report, Damage Records 1942-1949, NACP. 
109 Hall of Valor. 
110 Quoted in Walter R Borneman, The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King--The Five-Star Admirals 
Who Won the War at Sea  (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 255.   Admiral Raymond Spruance was 
the Task Force 17 commander over the USS Enterprise (CV6) and the USS Hornet (CV8) at the battle of Midway.  
Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher relinquished to Spruance overall command of the US fleet in the Midway action when 
his carrier Yorktown was abandoned following the Hiryu dive bombing attack and subsequent loss of power.    
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Appendix A—USS Yorktown (CV5) Ship Characteristics 
 
 
Figure A1- USS Yorktown CV5 (photograph from The National World War II Museum) 
 
Ship Characteristics 
[Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, 97 and 392.] 
 
 
Displacement 19,576 tons    Length   810’    Width   110’    Speed   33 knots 
 
Complement     Officers   227     Enlisted   1990   (including Air Group) 
 
Air Group       97  Total aircraft in four Squadrons within the Air Group (188 airmen) 
                       VS5: 37  Scouting planes- Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers  (2 airmen) 
                       VB5: 18  Bombing planes- Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers (2 airmen) 
                       VT5: 18  Torpedo planes- Douglas TBD-1 Devastator torpedo planes (3 airmen)   
                       VF5: 18  Fighter planes- Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat fighter planes (1 airman)   
                         ---     6 other aircraft of varying types 
                       NOTE: after Coral Sea some Saratoga (CV3) aircrews were assigned to Yorktown 
 
Air Defense      8- 5”/38 caliber guns 
                          4- Quad 1.1 inch mounts 
                        24- 20 mm machine cannons 
                        24- 0.50 caliber machine guns 
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Appendix B- USS Yorktown DC Subdivisions and Repair Party Locations 
Figure B1—CV5 Damage Control Forward 
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Appendix B- USS Yorktown DC Subdivisions and Repair Party Locations 
Figure B2—CV5 Damage Control Aft  
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Appendix C–Yorktown CV5 Battle Damages  
Figure C1—Coral Sea Damage 
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Appendix C– Yorktown CV5 Battle Damages  
Figure C2: Midway- Hiryu dive bombing attack 
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Appendix C– Yorktown CV5 Battle Damages  
Figure C3—Midway- Hiryu torpedo attack 
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Appendix C– Yorktown CV5 Battle Damages  
Figure C4—IJN I-168 Submarine fatal damage 
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Appendix D- Executive Officer’s Report of [CV5 Midway] Action 
[Source:  Yorktown XO to CO, Subject: Executive Officer’s Report, June 16, 1942, Damage Records 1942-
1949, NACP.] 
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